Abstract. A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling people's noneconomic reasons for escalation.
A pervasive feature of human decision making is that it fails to meet the standards of normative decision theory (Dawes, 1998) . A frequent case of decision making deviating from rationality in this sense is the tendency to escalate commitment to a failing course of action (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976 Staw, , 1997 , that is, to continue investment in a project despite unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) . Normatively, decisions should be based entirely on the future expected outcomes (a principle called marginal decision making) (Dawes, 1988 , Frank, 1991 . Thus, costs incurred by prior decisions are irrelevant since they cannot influence future outcomes.
In the present study we focus on the question of how sunk costs affect investment decisions when there is transparent information about expected returns. As detailed below, previous research suggests that escalation does not occur when future outcomes are transparent. However, even if people under these circumstances know that they will not be better off economically, they may prefer not to change rather than to change their investment alternative due to other reasons, such as anticipation of regret, feelings of wastefulness, or strivings for consistency (Anderson, 2003) . Studying reactions to sunk costs when the information is transparent offers a point of comparison to examine what is driving irrational escalation in more complex situations. That is, without knowing how people will use information that is transparent, it is difficult to know whether their choices in nontransparent situations are due to misrepresentations of the situation or other psychological factors.
Although escalation is a phenomenon that has received extensive empirical support, its generality has been questioned (Garland, Sandefur, & Rogers, 1990; Heath, 1995; McCain, 1986; Northcraft & Neale, 1986) . For instance, Tan and Yates (1995) suggest that previously demonstrated effects of escalation in part stem from the fact that explicit estimates of future or expected returns have been omitted. Since such estimates are likely to be present in real-world investments, the ecological validity and practical relevance of previous research may be low. Northcraft and Wolf (1984) furthermore argued that leaving out estimates of expected future returns makes it dubious whether further resource allocation to a project with sunk costs is irrational. Heath (1995) argued and demonstrated that when estimates of future returns are provided, people may actually de-escalate (i.e., discontinue investments too early) in response to previous investments. Parks and Conlon (1990) also reported de-escalation rather than escalation when presenting explicit prospective information, and escalation when the prospective information was ambiguous.
Further emphasizing that transparency of information is important, Northcraft and Neale (1986) showed that escalation was reduced when increasing the sa-lience of opportunity costs. They proposed that escalation is accounted for by the fact that people often ignore opportunity costs and therefore frame the decision as a choice between a certain loss (discontinue investment) or a possible loss (continue investment). Consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , people are then risk seeking, that is, continue investment. Hence, as these studies suggest, escalation increases when decision situations are nontransparent, in other words, when information about expected net returns and alternative investment opportunities are lacking.
Three different accounts may be proposed of how sunk costs affect investment decisions when there is transparent information about expected returns. First, marginal decision making (Frank, 1991) posits that people will choose the alternative with greatest net returns or be indifferent if the alternatives have equal net returns. Thus, sunk costs are expected to be ignored, which is regarded as the normatively correct choice. Second, in line with previous findings when future net returns are nontransparent, people may be expected to escalate in response to sunk costs. Thus, according to the "escalation tendency," it is predicted that people choose the alternative in which they have made previous unsuccessful investments. Proposed explanations for why they would do this are that people do not want to appear wasteful (Arkes, 1996; Arkes & Blumer, 1985) or want to justify previous decisions (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981) . Third, as part of a mental budgeting theory, Heath (1995) proposed the rate-of-return hypothesis stating that when outcomes are transparent people will make their decisions based on a mental budget including prior as well as future outcomes. Only if expected returns exceed total (prior and new) investments, people are expected to continue to invest. Otherwise they are expected to discontinue to invest.
In an experiment we investigate how decisions will be affected by sunk costs if expected returns and alternatives are transparent. Predictions from marginal decision making, the escalation tendency, and the rateof-return hypothesis are contrasted. A total of nine investment problems with sunk costs were administered to a group of participants (these problems were what Boehne and Paese (2000) labeled as "incremental investment decisions" rather than "resource utilization decisions"). All problems have specified alternatives that vary in required new investments and expected returns. Hence, marginal decision making predicts that participants will choose the alternative with 1 Some of the problems were presented in different combinations to several other groups. Indicating that presentation order is irrelevant and that the effects are obtained in between-subjects comparisons, the results were very similar for comparable problems. the largest expected net returns or be indifferent if the alternatives have equal expected net returns. In contrast, consistent with the escalation tendency, it is predicted that participants will always choose the alternative with the sunk costs, that is, the alternative in which they have made prior investments. The investment problems are furthermore constructed so that total investments (i.e., prior and required new investments) always exceed expected returns. Since this information is transparent, the rate-of-return hypothesis predicts that investments will be discontinued, that is, that participants will choose the alternative with no sunk costs.
Method Participants
Sixty-two undergraduates (46 women and 16 men) participated as a course requirement. Forty-four were enrolled in the introductory psychology course at Göteborg University, Sweden, and 18 in a similar course at the adjacent Borås Community College. The participants' mean age was 30.0 years ranging from 19 to 48 years.
Materials and Procedure
All participants responded to the same nine investment problems appearing on separate pages in a booklet administered in classes immediately after a lecture. The investment problems are given in Table 1 . They were presented in the fixed order 1 #0, #8, #2; #5, #7, #3, #6, #4, and #1. Problem #0 is the baseline problem with two investment alternatives (project A or B) with equal required new investments and expected returns. A prior investment (sunk cost) has been incurred for project A. Problem #1 is identical to problem #0 except that an indifference alternative is added. In problems #2 to #6, projects A and B differ either in required new investments, expected returns, or both. In problem #7, project B is replaced by an alternative not to invest, which gives an expected 15 % return for the same investments. In problem #8, projects A and B have the same expected returns with a sunk cost incurred for project A. The difference to problem #0 is that a prior investment in project B has led to net returns. 
Results

Escalation Tendency
In Table 2 , the number of choices to continue to invest in project A or in the alternative are given for the nine problems. In six of the problems, a majority of participants chose project A, in which prior investments had been made. In problem #0, a large majority of participants chose to continue to invest in project A despite the expected net returns being the same as for project B. An equal split of choices between projects A and B would be expected from marginal decision making. Although several participants expressed indifference in problem #1 when they could do this, the majority of the remaining participants chose project A. Omitting indifferent participants, the proportion of choices of project A was the same as in problem #0 (73.0 %). This difference between the proportion of choices of project A and project B is significant,
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(1, N = 37) = 7.8, p Ͻ .01. Comparing problems #3 and #4 also shows that the alternative with sunk costs is favored. In both problems, the alternative with the lower required new investment is chosen more frequently, but when this alternative is incurred by a sunk cost as in problem #4, it is more clearly preferred. This difference is significant according to McNemar's test of paired replicates,
(1, N = 59) = 3.8, p Ͻ .05. Also, when there is a transparent risk of loosing the new investment as in problem #6, a significantly larger number of participants choose to continue to invest in project A, in which required new investments are larger. In several of the problems, the results thus demonstrate escalation. It is at the same time evident that escalation varies in strength. In fact, in some problems a majority chose to discontinue investment. 
Marginal Decision Making
Despite the results demonstrating escalation, they do not rule out that marginal decision making plays a role. This is most clearly disclosed in problem #2, where a majority chose the alternative with larger expected net returns. The difference to problem #0 was statistically significant in McNemar's test of paired replicates,
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(1, N = 59) = 23.0, p Ͻ .001. Hence, it is clearly not the case that future outcomes are ignored in the presence of sunk costs.
That new investments and future returns matter is also apparent from the results for problems #3 and #4. In these problems, the expected net returns are the same for both alternatives, but the alternative with the lower required new investment is favored. In problem #3, this makes alternative B slightly preferred. McNemar's test of paired replicates showed that the difference to problem #0 was significant,
(1, N = 58) = 10.3, p Ͻ .01. However, in problem #4, where prior investments had been made in the alternative with the lower required new investment, the proportion of choices to continue to invest is not higher than for problem #0. Furthermore, in problem #5, participants clearly preferred project A, for which expected net returns were higher, although the required new investment was lower for project B. From the results of problems #2, #3, #4, and #5, it seems clear that participants take into account expected net returns when they are transparent.
Rate-of-Return Hypothesis
According to Heath's (1995) rate-of-return hypothesis, people are expected to discontinue investments if total costs (the sum of prior investments and required new investments) exceed expected returns. Since this was the case for all problems, participants should invariably discontinue to invest. The observed escalation in the majority of the problems is thus inconsistent with the hypothesis. It may be argued that the lack of support is due to a different format of the problems entailing an explicit choice between two alternatives, whereas in the experiments of Heath (1995) participants chose between continuing or discontinuing investment. In Heath's study, a 15 % return could be expected from other investments. In partial support of this argument, in problem #7, where the alternative of choosing project A is to discontinue investment, escalation is weaker than in problem #0. This difference was, however, not significant in McNemar's test of paired replicates (p = .57). Yet, more participants discontinued investment in project A even though the expected returns were considerably lower than in problem #0 (15 % vs. 100 %). It may also be noted that the percentage of participants who discontinued investment (33.9 %) did not deviate much from the average of 40 % reported by Heath (1995, Study 1) .
The result of problem #8 is inconsistent with marginal decision making and the escalation tendency, but in line with the rate-of-return hypothesis. In this problem the only difference between projects A and B is whether the prior outcome is a loss or a gain. In project A prior investment has not yielded any returns while they have in project B. Indicating that participants prefer the alternative in which future returns exceed total investments, a significantly larger number of participants chose to invest in project B.
Discussion
It has been argued that for escalation to occur it is necessary that alternative investments and expected net returns are nontransparent (Heath, 1995; Simonson & Staw, 1992; Staw, 1997) . In the present experiment, escalation was, however, demonstrated also when these conditions were not met. In fact, in several of the problems with transparent outcomes, participants continued to invest in the project that had in-curred a sunk cost. Escalation was found for problems in which the differences between future returns and required new investments (problems #0, #1, and #4) or the expected net returns (problem #6) were the same for both alternatives. A weaker escalation tendency was observed when an indifference alternative was added (problem #1), when a choice was made between continue or discontinue investment rather than between two alternatives (problem #7), and when the expected values were the same but the required new investment in the alternative was lower (problem #6).
There were two exceptions to escalation. Indicating the importance of marginal decision making, one exception was that escalation did not occur when expected net returns were higher for the alternative (problem #2), and escalation tended to be stronger when expected net returns were lower (problem #5). Furthermore, no escalation was observed when the expected net returns were equal but the new investments were lower for the alternative investment (problem #3). However, the results for other problems (problems #4, #5, and #6) ruled out that the absence of escalation was due to lower required new investment costs.
The second exception from escalation and in line with the rate-of-return hypothesis was when participants faced alternatives with equal expected net returns and one alternative had led to a prior gain (problem #8). Compared to problem #0, a preference reversal was observed. The alternative chosen by a majority of participants had positive prior returns. Escalation is identified as continued investment in a failing course of action (Staw, 1997) . Thus, one should expect participants to ignore the positive prior returns. On the other hand, previous research (Gärling, Karlsson, Romanus, & Selart, 1997; Laughhunn & Payne, 1984; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) has recurrently shown that a prior gain also affects a current choice.
Taken together, the results demonstrate that when information about outcomes and alternatives is transparent, participants use this information to decide whether to continue or discontinue a previous investment. Also, they demonstrate that neither the escalation tendency, marginal decision making, nor the rateof-return hypothesis unanimously explain how sunk costs affect decisions when there is transparent information. Especially when contrasting the results from problems #0, #2, and #8, it is apparent that none of the theories by themselves provide a sufficient account.
The results suggest that even if people know that they will not gain more money by continuing to invest in an alternative in which they have invested before, they may still do this as long as they do not earn more money by changing to another alternative. In line with Arkes and Hutzel (2000) , overestimation of future returns for the sunk-cost alternative is not necessary for people to prefer to continue to invest in a previously chosen alternative. Due to several possible reasons, including anticipated regret from changing investment alternative, perceived transaction or action costs, costs in terms of feelings of wastefulness, or strivings for consistency, the starting point for the evaluation of alternatives is to not change rather than to change investment alternative (Anderson, 2003) . This is important to note in order to understand why escalation occurs in more complex situations. For instance, one proposed explanation of escalation is that people escalate in order to justify previous investments and outcomes (Brockner, 1992) . Such a justification process may be a way of strengthening a preference that one already has rather than being the cause of the preference. That is, one may justify continuing to invest in an alternative because one prefers it rather than preferring it because one wants to justify it.
Escalation was recently referred to as "the human tendency to judge options according to the size of previous investments rather than the size of the expected return" (Ayton & Arkes, 1998, p. 40) . The present results indicate that this should not be taken literally since they show that current costs and benefits matter also in the presence of prior investments. That is, with transparent investment alternatives, neither required additional investments and expected returns nor prior investments are ignored. Still, that participants take net returns into account is less surprising than that they also take sunk costs into account in these transparent investment decisions. However, they do not seem to do this in the straightforward way suggested by the rate-of-return hypothesis (Heath, 1995) , that is, by first summing prior and required new investments and then comparing the sum to expected returns. Little support is in fact obtained for this hypothesis in the present experiment, since escalation was the most common response to sunk costs.
To summarize and conclude, the present research shows that sunk costs have an impact on investment decisions even when their future outcomes and alternatives are transparent. Although neither predictions from the escalation tendency, marginal decision making, or the rate-of-return hypothesis unanimously account for the demonstrated effects, there is a predominant tendency of escalation in response to sunk costs. Even if people know that they will not be economically better off by continuing to invest in an alternative in which they have made prior investments, they may have several other reasons for doing this. A more comprehensive understanding may be achieved when future research disentangles these reasons. 
